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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Associationfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,'
gene patents have been called into question. Interestingly, in Myriad, both the
district court and the Federal Circuit cite to Funk Brothers as a case that
delineates the boundaries of patentable subject matter.2 In fact, since 1948, Funk
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. has been cited for the proposition that
certain types of natural products do not fall within the scope of patent protection. 3
Moreover, many casebooks use Funk Brothers in one form or another to teach
the boundaries of subject matter patentability. 4 However, this article argues that
Funk Brothers is erroneously relied upon by judges and juries alike to determine
the limits of patentable subject matter, and that in reality, Funk Brothers is a case
that outlines the obviousness standard.
This article departs from the dogma that Funk Brothers delineates the
limits of patentable subject matter and gives several rationales for why Funk
Brothers is, in actuality, a case that outlines an obviousness standard. As an
initial matter, one only needs to look to the historical background in which Funk
Brothers sits to understand this maxim. Funk Brothers was decided before the
codification of the 1952 Patent Act and, in fact, simply defines the current
obviousness standard later codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Accordingly, Funk
Brothers should not be cited as a case against the patentability of genes under
non-patentable subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 101). Interestingly, the analysis that
the Funk Brothers Court uses is, at its core, an obviousness analysis. This article
suggests that the breadth of subject matter patentability should be kept broad.
Furthermore, this article suggests that the novelty and obviousness standards are
better tools that can limit and define the boundaries of patentability for gene
patents.
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many readers who offered comments on the earlier drafts, including Will Rhee, Anne Lofaso, Jena
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1 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2 Id. at 1359 ("Applying the judicially created exception to the otherwise broad demarcation of
statutory subject matter in section 101 can be difficult.. . . Funk Brothers and Chakrabartydo not
stake out the exact bounds of patentable subject matter. Instead, each applies a flexible test to the
specific question presented in order to determine whether the claimed invention falls within one of
the judicial exceptions to patentability.").
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1948).
4 See EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION 821 (5th ed. 1998); WILLIAM H. FRANCIS, ROBERT C. COLLINS, JAMES D. STEVENS,
ANDREW M. GROVE & MATTHEw J. SCHMIDT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW INCLUDING
TRADE SECRETS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS 532 (6th ed. 2007); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F.
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 160 nn.2-3 (5th ed. 2011) (also noting
that 1952 Patent Act may undermine the Funk Brothers holding).
.
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Gene patents are becoming increasingly important due to the nascent
field of "personalized medicine." Personalized medicine is a new industry born
from the idea that specific genetic makeups will result in different drug therapies.
For example, a disease such as breast cancer can occur through many different
pathways (for example, pathway A versus pathway B). The drugs that cure one
patient who has a disease working through pathway A may actually harm another
patient who has the same disease working through pathway B. Using the
patient's genetic makeup, physicians can now determine which pathway is
altered and subsequently administer the best drug regimen for the patient. Thus,
without gene patents, innovation in this field may be severely stifled.5
I argue that a traditional obviousness analysis should govern composition
of matter claims directed to genes. In contrast to a bright-line ban of gene patents
under the rubric of non-patentable subject matter, I argue that application of a
traditional obviousness standard to judge gene patents will create a flexible rule
that will help spur innovation. This is especially true in light of more recent
Supreme Court cases that actually deal with patent eligible subject matter, such
as Chakrabarty, and appellate level cases such as Bergy and Parke-Davis.6
Indeed, the court in Funk Brothers itself uses an obviousness type analysis to
invalidate a patent.
Part II discusses the relevant facts, procedural history and historical
background of Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. Part III shows how
Funk Brothers applies a traditional obviousness analysis to the facts of the case.
Part IV compares the obviousness analysis in Funk Brothers to the obviousness
analysis in KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex. Part V reviews the evolution of the
obviousness standard when applied to chemical compositions of matter claims.
Part VI shows how the obviousness analysis can be applied to gene patents.
Finally, Part VII concludes and also suggests alternative models to limit gene
patents.

II. FUNKBROTHERS HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. Facts of Funk Brothers
The facts of Funk Brothers are relatively simple.! At the time when the
invention was conceived, it was well known that bacteria from the species
Rhizobium could be used to fix nitrogen, thereby helping the growth of legumes.
However, not every species of Rhizobium could fix nitrogen for every crop; thus,
a farmer had to determine the individual type of Rhizobium that would work best

Sean Tu, Jon Dudas, Phil Kiko & Bryan Wilson, A Perfect Storm is Brewing Against
PersonalizedMedicine, 4 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 1 (2010).
6 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952
(C.C.P.A. 1979); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196
F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
7 See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129.
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for his specific type of crop. Compounding the problem was the fact that it was
generally believed that many species of Rhizobium produced an inhibitory effect
on other species of Rhizobium, whereby symbiotic nitrogen fixation by the plant
and the organism was inhibited, or even prevented, when two or more Rhizobium
8
species were present.
Thus, at the time of the invention, it was generally assumed that a farmer
could use only one strain of Rhizobium dependent on the type of crop grown. For
example, Rhizobium phaseoli was used only for garden beans, while Rhizobium
japonicum was used only for soy beans, and it was not possible to mix these two
types of Rhizobium in one package to use for both garden beans and soy beans.
Therefore, it was thought that the use of a single species of bacteria in a culture
presented a serious difficulty in the manufacture and distribution of Rhizobium
inoculants, because it was necessary to distribute a separate culture contained in a
separate package for each individual crop variety.
The inventor, Mr. Varley Sherman Bond, found that when several
specific strains of bacteria from the genus Rhizobium were combined, this
mixture of bacteria could be used to aid in nitrogen fixation for a variety of
crops. 9 This mixed culture of Rhizobia was capable of inoculating the seeds of
plants belonging to several cross-inoculation groups and had the same efficiency
in respect to nitrogen fixation as a culture, which contained only a single species
of the organism.' 0 To arrive at this invention, Mr. Bond had to select, cultivate,
and determine the specific strains of Rhizobium that, when combined with each
other, would effectively fix nitrogen without inhibiting the growth of the other
strains of Rhizobium. Mr. Bond's end product was a mixture of bacteria that
could fix nitrogen for a variety of crops without inhibiting each other. Thus,
using this invention, a farmer would only have to buy one package of bacteria for
all of his leguminous plants, instead of choosing several independent bacterial
strains dependent on the specific type of crop to be grown."
The representative composition claim from U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532
(the "'532 patent") issued to Mr. Bond recites: "An inoculant for leguminous
plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of
different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being
unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the
leguminous plant for which they are specific."' 2 It is important to note that: (1)
the broadest claims do not recite specific species of Rhizobium, 1 3 (2) no specific

Patent No. 2,200,532 p. 2 Is. bridging cols. 1-2 (filed Aug. 24, 1938).
Funk Bros, 333 U.S. at 130.
o '532 Patent p.2 Is.43-48.
" FunkBros, 333 U.S. at 131.
12 See '532 Patent, supra note 8, at p. 7 (claim
4).
13 Claims 1-3, 7 and 14 recite to specific species of Rhizobium. Additionally, claims 9-12 are
process or method claims for producing the composite bacterial inoculant. However, the Court
focused only on claim 4 as a representative claim. '532 Patent.
8 U.S.
9
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ratios of bacterial content are recited in the claims, and (3) no specific target
crops are recited in the claims.

B. Procedural History
The district court found the patent invalid for want of invention. 14
However, the district court also found that, if they were valid, the defendant
infringed.15 Although the district judge found the patent invalid, he said he did
so "'with reluctance,' as he was impressed with the very 'great diligence and
ingenuity' of Bond and with the results he had achieved." 1 6 However, the district
judge "believed [the invention] could not be classified under any subject defined
as patentable by the congressional act." 7
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit came to a different conclusion and held
the patent valid." The Appellate Court recognized that scientists of the time
were well informed as to the conventional tests, how to develop a bacterial
culture, and how to isolate a culture of specific bacterial strains from a culture.' 9
Additionally, the Court recognized that Bond did not create a new species of
bacteria and that it was known that some species of the bacteria were mutually
inhibitive. 20 However, in arguing for patentability of the invention, the court
acknowledged that there was a distinct market need for this product,2 1 a failure of
others in the field,22 and even a teaching away of others in the face of this
market need. Thus, in answering the question of whether "the court erred in
concluding that, under the law Bond made nothing patentable" 24 the Appellate
Court found that Bond's invention was patentable.
The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and invalidated the
patent. The Supreme Court held that:
No species acquires a different use. The combination of species
produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and
no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same
effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their
use in combination does not improve in any way their natural
functioning.25

Kalo Inoculant Co. v. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 161 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S.
127 (1948).
14

15Id.
16

Id. at 984.

id.
"Id. at 986.
9
Id. at 983.
20 id.
17

21
22

23

24
25

Id. at 985, 987.

Id. at 986-87.

Id. at 988.
Id. at 984.

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
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The Supreme Court's rationale for invalidating the patent is further
discussed in Section III below.
C. Historical Perspectives and Legal Framework
The first patent statue enacted in 1790 gave members of a patent board
the ability to grant a patent "if they shall deem the invention or discovery
sufficiently useful and important." 2 6 The terms "sufficiently useful and
important" could be considered progenitors of the utility and nonobviousness
requirements found in 35 U.S.C. § 101/103, respectively. The term "sufficiently
important" could mean sufficient technical importance or sufficient economic
importance. Interestingly, this provision was repealed in the 1793 Patent Act and
then reinstated in the 1836 Patent Act. Specifically, the 1836 Patent Act stated
that the Commissioner of patents could issue a patent to an invention "if the
Commissioner shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and important." 27
Before the Patent Act of 1952, the Revised Statutes of 1874 placed most
of the conditions for patentability in a single section (§ 4886). Additionally, the
only statutory requirements for patentability in the 1874 statutes were novelty
and utility.2 8 Before the 1952 Patent Act, the obviousness standard was only a
creature of case law. The obviousness standard was first taken up by the
Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.2 9 The Hotchkiss Court gave rise to a
vague standard based on an ambiguous requirement for "invention." This
"invention" requirement was a nebulous standard that required an intangible
quality beyond mere novelty. Judge Learned Hand later stated that the
"invention" standard was "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a
phantom as exi[sts] in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts." 30
Over 100 years after Hotchkiss, the 1952 Patent Act finally clarified the
nature of the term "invention." This is crucial because Funk Brothers was
decided on February 16, 1948, just before the 1952 Patent Act. In contrast to
previous statutes, the 1952 Act placed the requirements for patentability into
logical components and added the nonobviousness requirement. The authors of
the 1952 Patent Act, Giles Rich and Pasquale Federico, included the obviousness
standard because the previous "invention" standard outlined in Hotchkiss was "so
vague and ambiguous as to be unworkable."3
With this historical framework in mind, one must be careful when
interpreting cases before the 1952 Patent Act, especially when the case deals with
obviousness. Judge Rich in In re Bergy (decided in 1979) cautioned against

26

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20 (1836).
28 The 1952 Patent Act codified the utility and novelty requirements as sections
101 and 102,
respectively, of Title 35 of the United States Code.
29 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
30 Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
3' JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 195 (3d ed. 2009).
27
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overly broad interpretation of pre-1952 patent cases. Specifically, Judge Rich
stated:
the words "invention," "inventive" and "invent" had distinct legal
implications related to the concept of patentability which they have not
had [prior to the 1952 Patent Act] .

. .

. Statements in the older cases

must be handled with care lest the terms used in their reasoning clash
with the reformed terminology of the present statute; lack of meticulous
care may lead to distorted legal conclusions. 32
Judge Rich went further, and showed that the old term "invention" was
replaced by the new statutory provision embodied by 35 U.S.C. § 103, requiring
nonobviousness.33
III. FUNK BROTHERS NOVELTY/OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS
Funk Brothers is a pre-1952 decision. Thus, analysis of the decision
must be carefully construed not to confuse subject matter patentability with
issues such as novelty, obviousness, and written description. This is true
especially for the obviousness standard, which pre-1952 did not have a statutory
basis. In this section, I argue that the Supreme Court in Funk Brothers engaged
in an obviousness type analysis and not a patentable subject matter type analysis.
In sum, the Court engaged in a two-step process: first, the Court established a
market need for the invention; second, the Court determined that one of skill in
the art could create the desired product without undue experimentation and with a
predictable expectation of success. In Funk Brothers, the Court found that there
was an economic reason to create the invention; however, the Court found that
the qualitative advance over the earlier technology was too miniscule to award a
patent.
The Funk Brothers Court began its obviousness analysis of the invention
by looking at the possible economic factors that motivated the creation of this
product. 34 This economic analysis step may be attributed to the 1836 Patent Act
which required that the invention be "sufficiently important." This type of
analysis is akin to the secondary factors of nonobviousness related to the
commercial success of the product.35 When applied to the facts in the Funk
Brothers case, the Court recognized that there was "an advantage in the
combination. The farmer need not buy six different packages for six different

In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
3 Id. Interestingly, Judge Rich held in In re Bergy that a "biologically pure culture of the
microorganism Streptomyces vellosus" was patentable subject matter. Id. at 967. The court
recognized that the idea of patenting a living organism was a case of first impression. However,
they held that the claimed product, even though it was living, was "an industrial product used in an
industrial process." Id. at 974.
34 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
35 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1966).
32
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He can buy one package and use it for any or all of his crops of

leguminous plants . . . . [P]ackaging of inoculants may well have been an

important commercial advance."3 6 Here, the Court demonstrated that market
forces established a need for this type of product. This market need established
the framework for the motivation to combine the various species of bacteria to
solve the market problem.
The second step of the Court's analysis was to determine if one of skill in
the art could create the desired product without undue experimentation and an
expectation of success. 37 This technological inquiry is similar to the 1952 Patent
Act nonobviousness standard, which requires the court to determine the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.
In continuing its obviousness analysis, the Court stated "once nature's
secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains of the species Rhizobium
was discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a
simple step. Even though [the invention] may have been the product of skill, it
certainly was not the product of invention."39 Here, the Court argued that mixing
the six different types of non-inhibitory bacteria could have been done by anyone
of skill in the art. Additionally, the Court insinuated that any one of skill in the
art would know how to, and would be motivated to, combine these strains of
bacteria. Thus, the Court held that even though it may be difficult to find the
bacterial strains that could interact with each other without inhibiting each
others' growth, the mixture of bacteria was only an obvious improvement over
these individual strains of bacteria. This type of obviousness analysis, which was
not statutorily present in 1948, was made explicit in the 1952 Act and also in
Graham v. John Deere.4 0 Furthermore, the Funk Brothers Court engaged in an
almost identical type of analysis as seen in the KSR Court, as described in Part IV
below. In sum, the Funk Brothers Court engaged in a pre-1952 Patent Act
obviousness type analysis, which undermines an interpretation that the Court was
outlining a rule for patentable subject matter.
IV. COMPARISON OF FUNK BROTHERS OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS
TO THE CURRENT ESR OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS
The obviousness standard is set forth in the 1952 Patent Act, codified at
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the

6

FunkBros., 333 U.S. at 132.

See id. at 132.
See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2011).
" Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 132 (emphasis added).
40 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
36 (1966).
3

38
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prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.4 1
The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute in Graham v. John
Deere. The Court stated:
42

Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are
to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness
of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the
origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.43
Therefore, the analysis starts with determining the level of ordinary skill
in the relevant field. Then, one must ascertain the features and elements of the
claimed invention. Finally, through the lens of the person of ordinary skill in the
art at the time the invention was created, one must determine if the differences
between those features are nonobvious over the prior art.
Prior to KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex, the Federal Circuit stated that
the "obvious to try" standard "has long been held not to constitute
obviousness."" However, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, the Supreme
45
Court breathed new life into the "obvious to try" limitation on nonobviousness.
Specifically, the Court recognized that this limitation may come into play when
the prior art's solution to the problem may not work.4 6 Additionally, if the prior
art required the skilled artisan to engage in undue experimentation to determine
the best solution, the invention may be nonobvious, even though it was obvious
to try. The Court stated:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and
there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his
or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is

41 35
42
43

U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).

Graham, 383 U.S. at 1.

1Id. at

17.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 414 (2007) (citing Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co.,
119 F. App'x 282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
45
1Id. at 427.
4 Id. at 420.
4
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likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common
sense.47
Therefore, the KSR "obvious to try" rule can be broken down into three
parts. First, one must determine if there was a design need or market pressure to
solve a problem. Second, one must determine if there are a finite number of
identified, predictable solutions. Finally, one must determine if the skilled
artisan had good reason to pursue these known and finite solutions.
The KSR rule is consistent and similar to the analysis done by the Funk
Brothers Court. In fact, when the "obvious to try" rule of KSR is applied to the
facts in Funk Brothers, the result would have also resulted in invalidation of the
'532 patent. Below, I apply the KSR rule to the Funk Brothers' facts.
First, the KSR Court focused on market forces as motivation to make
48
The Funk
improvements upon the prior art and thereby make them obvious.
Brothers Court also looked to market forces and recognized that there was a
commercial need for the invention. Specifically, the Funk Brothers Court
recognized that
The farmer need not buy six different packages for six different crops.
He can buy one package and use it for any or all of his crops of
leguminous plants .... [Tihe packages of mixed inoculants also hold
advantages for the dealers and manufacturers by reducing inventory
problems and the like . . . . [P]ackaging of inoculants may well have
been an importantcommercial advance.49

Second, the KSR Court argued that there should be a finite number of
identifiable and predictable solutions to the problem.o When applied to the facts
of Funk Brothers, the Court implied that the solutions were finite and predictable
once it was known that certain strains of Rhizobium were non-inhibitive. 5 ' Thus,
there was a limited number of bacterial species that could be used. Additionally,
the universe of bacterial species would not require undue experimentation by the
skilled artisan to find those species that were non-inhibitive.52 Accordingly,

47

1Id. at 421.

Id. at 421 ("When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a
finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to
pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp."); id at 417 ("When a work is available
in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one."); id. at 419 ("In many fields it may be that there is little
discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market
demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends."); id. at 424 ("There then existed
a marketplace that created a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and
the prior art taught a number of methods for achieving this advance.").
49 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131-132 (1948) (emphasis added).
50
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
" See Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 131.
48

52See id.
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finding those bacteria that were non-inhibitive would only require routine
analysis by one of skill in the art.
Finally, the Funk Brothers Court then determined that one of skill in the
art would know how to combine these six different bacteria, and would be
motivated to do so." The Court stated that "once nature's secret of the noninhibitive quality of certain strains of the species Rhizobium was discovered, the
state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. Even
though [the invention] may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the
product of invention."S4 Accordingly, each element of the "obvious to try" test of
KSR is fulfilled, namely that there was market pressure to solve a problem with
finite and predictable solutions and motivation to pursue this type of solution. In
applying an analysis similar to KSR, the Funk Brothers Court held the '532
patent invalid due to a lack of inventive step over the prior art. Specifically, the
Funk Brothers Court found that the simple step of mixing non-inhibitive bacteria
together was obvious in light of the knowledge that certain strains of the species
of Rhizobium were non-inhibitive.
Alternatively, the Court could have found that there was simply a
combination of known elements. Specifically, the court stated that "[the different
bacterial species'] use in combination does not improve in any way their natural
functioning."ss However, this too is simply an obviousness analysis. In fact, the
court in KSR cited to Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., for
the proposition that a patent will fail under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if, though a
"combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to
the nature and quality of [the previously patented inventions]."
Interestingly, the Court could have come to the opposite conclusion also
using an obviousness type analysis, similar to that found in United States v.
Adams.57 In Adams, the inventor discovered a new wet-battery comprised of
magnesium and cuprous chloride.5 8 Previously, it was thought that wateractivated batteries were successful only when combined with electrolytes
detrimental to the use of magnesium. Thus, the Court found the invention nonobvious, in part because these "long-accepted factors . . . [would] deter any

investigation into such a combination as is used by [the inventor]." 9 Similarly,
Mr. Bond was able to go against the conventional wisdom that the specific
bacterial mixture would not work in combination. In fact, previous studies had
shown that mixtures of Rhizobium would inhibit each other. In reciting its rule,
the Adams Court stated "known disadvantages in old devices which would

" See id. at 131-32.
54

Id. at 132.
131.

5 Id. at

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc.
v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 62 (1969)).
s7 United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
" Id. at 42.
9
' Id. at 52.
56
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naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in
determining obviousness."60 Accordingly, the court in Funk Brothers could have
found the patent valid using a "teaching away" type of argument. The Adams
case simply illustrates that the obviousness rule can be used flexibly to take into
account the totality of the circumstances. This is in contrast to the seemingly
bright line rule defined by the patentable subject matter bar.
However, whether the court found the invention valid or invalid via
"obvious to try," "a combination of known elements" or that it "taught away"
from the prior art, each analysis fits squarely within the rubric of an obviousness
analysis, and not a patentable subject matter analysis. This analysis shows that
the obviousness standard is flexible, and allows a court to balance the totality of
the evidence when judging the validity of a patent. This is in contrast to the use
of a patentable subject matter analysis, which acts as a bright line rule.
V. APPLICATION OF THE OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS TO CHEMICAL
COMPOSITION OF MATTER CLAIMS
Previous studies have considered chemical patents in light of the
It is important to note that chemical drug
nonobviousness requirement.
compound inventions can appear less obvious in hindsight than they appeared ex
ante. Standard chemical modifications of known drug compounds are obvious in
that a pharmaceutical chemist of ordinary skill could and would be motivated to
make these standard modifications. However, there may be great uncertainty in
predicting the properties of the resulting molecules. Small modifications in the
structure of a molecule can bring about radical changes in drug properties.
Accordingly, unexpected results/unexpected properties of the new molecule may
counter the obviousness assumption related to a standard modification of a prior
art molecule. These properties could only be observed ex post, after the molecule
was synthesized and tested. Thus, in the case of drug type chemical composition
of matter claims, researchers can rebut a prima facie obviousness rejection expost with declaration evidence and/or experiments showing the unique properties
over the prior art molecule(s).
This presentation of ex post data is exemplified in In re Papesch.62 The
applicant in Papesch claimed a novel triethyl compound that was similar to a
related trimethyl compound.63 The applicant provided declaration evidence
which stated that the triethyl compound had anti-inflammatory properties, while
the trimethyl compounds did not have these properties.64 However, both the

60

Id.

61 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L.

REv. 691 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shape of Things to Come: Pharma'sNonobvious
Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 375 (2008).
62 In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
6
1Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
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examiner and the Board of Appeals rejected the claims stating that the
compounds were obvious homologs of the methyl groups that could be prepared
in the same manner as the methylated composition shown in the prior art.
In Papesch, the CCPA reversed the Board of Appeals, and created a rule
where actual ex post evidence can trump ex ante speculation.
Specifically,
Judge Rich stated "[i]f that which appears, at first blush, to be obvious though
new is shown by evidence not to be obvious, then the evidence prevails over
surmise or unsupported contention and a rejection based on obviousness must
fall."67 Furthermore, to support this proposition, the Court stated "the apparent
obviousness of the compound (including its properties) was overcome by
evidence of unexpected advantageous properties the claim to it was held
patentable; but where no such properties were shown to exist it remained an
obvious compound with obvious properties."68
Correspondingly, in In re O'Farrell,the Federal Circuit stated that for
"many inventions that seem quite obvious, there is no absolute predictability of
success until the invention is reduced to practice. There is always at least a
possibility of unexpected results, that would then provide an objective basis for
showing that the invention, although apparently obvious, was in law
nonobvious." 6 9 Accordingly, ex post evidence can be used to rebut a primafacie
case of obviousness.
Most recently, in Genetics Institute, LLC v. Novartis Vaccines &
Diagnostics, Inc., the Federal Circuit permitted a showing of unexpected results
discovered after the patent applications at issue were filed to support a finding of
non-obviousness.70 In Genetics Institute, scientists raced to develop a truncated
version of Factor VIII, an essential blood clotting protein. Both Genetics
Institute and Novartis were able to develop a truncated version of the protein. In
order to establish non-obviousness, Novartis relied on a showing of unexpected
results, even though the appreciation of this unexpected result was well after the
filing date of the invention. The majority stated that "every property of a claimed
compound need not be fully recognized as of the filing date of a patent
application to be relevant to nonobviousness." 7 1 Thus, the majority held that
"evidence of unexpected results may be used to rebut a case of prima facie
obviousness even if that evidence was obtained after the patent's filing or issue
date." 72

Id. at 383-86.
Id. at 391-92.
67 Id. at 386-87.
6
1Id. at 389.
69 In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
70 Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7n Id. at 1307.
65
66

72 Id.
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VI. APPLICATION OF THE OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS TO GENE
PATENTS AND DIAGNOSTIC METHODS
A. What is a Gene Patent?
Genes are simply chemical compositions that are comprised of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that carries the information necessary for a genetic
DNA is also a chemical composition that is made up of chains of
trait.,
nucleotides: Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Guanine (G) or Cytosine (C). "Base
pairing" allows A to bond only to T and C to bond only to G. This specific base
pairing allows a DNA molecule to be used as a template to synthesize
complementary DNA, which also ensures that genetic information passes on
correctly from progenitor cell to daughter cell. Mutated DNA can occur when
DNA is damaged or replication does not occur with complete fidelity. Many
times these mutant DNA generate a protein with different properties from its
wild-type counterpart. Additionally, mutant DNA can be associated with
diseases. For example, mutations in the BRCAI/BRCA2 genes are associated
with an increased risk for breast cancer.74 The average woman in the United
States has about a 12-13% risk of developing breast cancer in her lifetime.75 In
contrast, women with abnormal BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes "can have up to an
80% risk of being diagnosed with breast cancer during their lifetimes."76
Accordingly, the BRCAl and BRCA2 genes can be used to help diagnose and
prevent breast cancers with early detection and quick surgical and/or chemical
treatments.
For the most part, DNA is only a means to an end. That is, the sole
function of DNA in vivo is to code for protein. However, when DNA is isolated
and purified into cDNA form, or concentrated in an amount that is not present in
the body, it is transformed into a product that has different properties. For
example, isolated DNA has the ability to be sequenced and then used as a marker
for risk of disease. Similar to the analysis done by Judge Hand in Parke-Davis,
once isolated and purified the product is transformed by the hand of man, into
something substantively different than a composition of matter found in nature. 77
The transformation of an isolated and purified natural substance can be

See JOCEYLN E. KREBS, ELLIoTr S. GOLDSTEIN & STEPHEN T. KILPATRICK, LEWIN's GENES X 224 (10th ed. 2009).
74 Genetics, BREASTCANCER.ORG, http://www.breastcancer.org/risk/factors/genetics.jsp (last visited
Apr. 18, 2012).
n

75 id.
76

id

n Judge Hand held a patent directed to purified adrenaline in base form and adrenaline salt valid,
because "the base was an original production of [the inventor]. That was a distinction not in
degree, but in kind." Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911),
modified, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
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patentable if the transformation creates a product that is "different in kind" and
not simply a "difference in degree."08
Interestingly, I note that many patents directed to "known" genes will not
be patentable due to the novelty standard. This is because, historically, many of
the "known" genes have already been cloned and patented or published over the
past 30 years. Many of these patents have expired or are about to expire. When
applying the obviousness standard to these patents, genes were isolated when the
state of the art was much less developed, and there was no reasonable expectation
of successfully cloning a gene, even for proteins that were well characterized
both functionally and structurally. Accordingly, most known genes will face a
novelty bar to patentability.7 9 However, this analysis will most likely not apply
to the mutants of genes which cause disease.
B. Obviousness Analysis as Applied to Gene Patents
The Federal Circuit has previously considered application of the
obviousness standard to DNA patents.80 Gene patents, however, are not the
stereotypical composition of matter. Although gene patents are unquestionably
compositions of matter, the significant function of genes comes from their ability
to code for information (protein synthesis). Similar to drug compounds, small
variations in the genetic code can have dramatic structural and/or functional
consequences on the encoded protein. For example, a mutation in a single
nucleotide of the Ras gene can create a Ras protein that replaces the glycine
amino acid at position 12 with a valine. This single mutation in the Ras protein
is involved in the development of many cancers. Accordingly, the ability to
detect this mutation gives physicians a powerful tool to diagnose and treat
patients. Accordingly, I distinguish between two important variations: (1)
composition of matter claims-gene patents, and (2) diagnostic method claims
based on identification of mutations in genes. In this analysis, I focus only on
composition of matter claims.
The first step in an obviousness analysis is to determine the scope and
content of the prior art. Admittedly, many genes have been patented or disclosed
in scientific journals. Thus, an inventor would have a hard time obtaining a
patent on a novel human gene, since most, if not all, have been disclosed.
However, this first step would not preclude a truly novel gene. A more
interesting case may be the claim to a mutant of a known gene. Here, small
variations in the known gene may cause huge functional consequences. Thus,

id.
Many genes were patented or published during the National Institute of Health's Human Genome
Project, as well as by Craig Venter's private genome sequencing project. Accordingly, many gene
patents may be anticipated under either 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
" In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re
Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
78
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there may be a plethora of information on both the known gene and the known
disease, but no information linking the gene with the disease.
The second step in an obviousness analysis is to identify the difference
between the prior art and the claims at issue. When applied to novel genes, by
definition, there would be no prior art. When applied to mutants of known genes,
there would be prior art based upon the known gene. Here, one would have to
However, because patents in
argue that the differences were minute.
biotechnology are highly unpredictable, small changes to the chemical
composition can lead to vastly different outcomes. Thus, even though the
differences may be small, they may be very significant. When applied to
diagnostic method claims, known genes linked to unknown functions would not
be contained in the prior art.
The third step in an obviousness analysis is to find the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art. For a typical drug compound, the skilled artisan could
be a chemist or medical doctor. In contrast, for gene patents, the typical artisan
would probably have a Ph.D. in biochemistry or molecular biology. This skilled
artisan would be versed in genetics and methods to clone genes as well as
determination of mutants that would be associated with a diseased state.
The fourth step is to determine the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter. This step is governed by KSR and other subtests (such as the
"teaching, suggestion or motivation" type tests). In KSR, the Court stated "[i]f a
person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars
its patentability." 8 ' When searching for mutations that are associated with
disease, there is usually no predictable formula one can use. Even with the
known structure of a gene, it is difficult to predict changes to specific amino
acids that may cause disease. Similarly, in the case of mutations in known genes,
there is usually no predictability in which areas of a gene, and which amino acid
mutations, will create significant functional differences. Even with known
protein structures, it is difficult to predict those mutations that will create the
desired functional outcome.
The final step in a classical obviousness analysis is to identify any
secondary factors such as commercial success, long felt need, teaching away, or
failure of others. These factors may play a small role in determining the
obviousness of gene patents. Specifically, it is difficult to see the commercial
value of a patent to a complete gene. Usually, sequencing of a whole gene is
unnecessary to determine if a mutation is present. Thus, a skilled artisan will
usually need to sequence only the portion of the gene that is important to
determine risk of a disease. Similarly, the commercial success of gene tests are
also dubious. In fact, in Austrialia, Myriad itself claims that they have not made
money with the BRCA1/BRCA2 breast cancer gene tests.82

" KSR Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
82 See Jake Meyer, Myriad Offers to "Gift" Its Breast Cancer Patent to Australia, COUNSIL FOR
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/blog/post
/Myriad-Offers-to-Gift-Its-Breast-Cancer-Patent-to-Australia.aspx.
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In a post-KSR case, the Federal Circuit has applied an obviousness type
analysis to invalidate a gene patent directed to the isolation and sequencing of the
DNA molecules that encode for the specific proteins. According to the Federal
Circuit, the prior art taught a protein of interest, a motivation to isolate the gene
coding for that protein, and illustrative instructions to use a monoclonal antibody
specific to the protein for cloning the NAIL gene. 4 The Court stated that there
would be a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention
in light of the teachings in the prior art.85 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
declined to limit KSR to the "predictable arts," as opposed to the "unpredicitable
arts" of chemistry and biotechnology.8 6
Since the Supreme Court revived the "obvious to try" doctrine in KSR,
the Federal Circuit in Kubin also resurrected its "obvious to try doctrine" outlined
in In re O'Farrell. The Federal Circuit noted that there were two classes where
"obvious to try" should not be equated to obviousness.8 8 First, "obvious to try"
should not be equated to obviousness if one of skill in the art was required to
vary all parameters of an experiment and try each of them, with no indication of
which parameters were critical or which directions were likely to be successful.89
Specifically, the Kubin Court stated "where a defendant merely throws
metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities,
courts should not succumb to hindsight claims of obviousness."90 The second
erroneous use would be where a new technology or general approach was being
explored, and the prior art only gave general guidance as to the particular form of
the claimed invention or how to achieve it.9 1 In O'Farrell,the Federal Circuit
stated that obviousness should be found where the prior art contained a detailed
and enabling methodology with evidence suggesting the methodology would
work. 92 Further, the Court noted that obviousness did not require absolute
predictability, but only a reasonable expectation of success.
The Kubin analysis gives significant weight to the technical difficulty of
solving the problem. Because it is no longer a difficult or challenging task for
molecular biologists to clone genes, as an ordinary molecular biologist can
basically create any DNA molecule. Accordingly, Kubin may be interpreted to
strike a heavy blow to those companies interested in patenting genes.
However, I do not believe the case is so bleak. Kubin does not stand for
the proposition that gene patents are necessarily obvious if the encoded protein

In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
M Id. at 1360.
85 Id.
86 id.
" See id. at 1359-60. See also In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
8 Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1359.
8

s9 id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1360 (citing In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894,
9 Id. (citing In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04

902 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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was previously described in the art. Kubin merely shifts the analysis to whether
or not there was (1) a suggestion or motivation to clone the specific gene, and (2)
if there was a reasonable expectation of success. In cases of DNA encoding
mutant proteins that cause disease, applicants can still present evidence of
nonbviousness such as unexpected results or unpredictability with regards to
success. This would be especially true if the structure or function of the protein
was previously unknown.
Unlike the inventions presented in Funk Brothers or KSR, gene patents
directed to mutant proteins associated with disease should not be held invalid for
obviousness reasons. Both sides of the patent debate realize that it is extremely
difficult to link a specific gene to a specific disease. Further compounding the
difficulty is determining point mutations in the gene associated with the disease
state. The difficulty of linking a mutant gene with a disease has been analogized
to trying to see a dime on the ground with the naked eye from atop of the Empire
State Building. Accordingly, even with the current state of the art when it comes
to identifying genetic mutants associated with specific disease, the art is still
fairly unpredictable.
Opponents of gene patents would correctly argue that just because an
invention is difficult to create does not make it patent eligible subject matter.
Additionally, opponents of gene patents could argue that it is an inherent quality
of DNA to transmit data and information to produce proteins. Although both
may be true, these facts do not link either the DNA or the corresponding encoded
protein to any function. Furthermore, opponents of gene patents do not address
the fact that mutants in the DNA code were not linked to any disease. Linking
these mutant genes to a disease may overcome the obviousness issues for method
of use claims, where the use is placed as a direct limitation in the claim.
Similar to Papesch,9 4 ex post data can be applied to rebut a primafacie
case of obviousness. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that a prima facie
case of obviousness is established, gene patent applicants should be allowed to
present ex post evidence that the specific DNA sequence was never related to a
specific function. Additionally, applicants could show that specific mutations in
the DNA sequence not only alter function of the wild-type protein, but are linked
to a specific diseased state. Similar to drug-type chemical patents, these small
alterations in the DNA sequence can create monumental changes in structure
and/or function of the encoded protein. If these changes generate surprising or
unexpected results, then they should be included as evidence to help overcome an
obviousness rejection. Correspondingly, if these changes are found to be
predictable or expected based on known structures, properties and/or functions,
then the weight might turn in favor of invalidation of the specific gene patent.
Furthermore, this type of ex post data could be used to show utility that was not
present in a simple genetic sequence that was not linked to any useful function.

94
9

See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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C. Alternative Analysis of Gene Patents
Several scholars have reviewed issues specific to DNA patents in light of
KSR. For example, Rebecca Eisenberg reviews several cases involving DNA
technologies. 96 Eisenberg reviews older cases involving DNA sequences (In re
Bell and In re Deuel), and shows that while the PTO rejected patent claims
covering DNA sequences, the Federal Circuit would hold them patentable. 97 In
critiquing the Federal Circuit's holding in In re Bell and In re Deuel, Eisenberg
argues that the Federal Circuit began and ended its analysis "by asking whether
the prior art made the structure of the DNA molecule obvious." 98 Additionally,
in critiquing the Federal Circuit's holding in Deuel, Eisenberg argues that if the
Federal Circuit had "not been rigidly focused on structural similarity as the sine
qua non of chemical obviousness .

.

. the court might have considered whether

anything in the prior art other than a structurally similar DNA molecule would
have motivated a PHOSITA [person having ordinary skill in the art] to make the
claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success." 99
Although I agree that the Federal Circuit seems to focus its analysis on
the structure of the DNA molecule, I argue that even if the Federal Circuit
applied the obviousness test outlined in Papesch, the outcome would have been
the same. For example, in Bell, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO failed to
establish a prima facie case of obviousness, because there were over 1,036
possible DNA sequences that could code for the amino acid sequence for an
insulin-like growth factor protein.' 00 Accordingly, there were 1,036 possible
DNA sequences and the applicant was only claiming one of those sequences.'or
Furthermore, the PTO gave no rationale why one of skill in the art would focus
on that one specific sequence.10 2 Thus, the court insinuates that generation of the
1,036 possible DNA sequences would require undue experimentation by the
skilled artisan.
In Deuel, the Court went further and held claims valid even in the face of
references that discuss how to isolate DNA molecules from partial amino acid
sequences. In Deuel, the Federal Circuit concluded that isolated DNA sequences
encoding heparin-binding growth factors (HBGFs) were non-obvious. 03 The
Court found the DNA compositions non-obvious even in light of prior art
references that disclosed: (1) protein sequences to HBGFs, and (2) methods of
isolating DNA molecules encoding proteins based on known partial amino acid
Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 403-07; see also Ying Pan, Note, A Post-KSR Consideration of
Gene Patents: The "Obvious to Try" StandardLimits the Patentabilityof Genes, 93 MARQ. L. REv.
285 (2009).
9 Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 403-06.
9
Id. at 403.
99
Id. at 406.
'In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
96
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sequences.'" In holding the patent valid, the Court held "the existence of a
general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to
the question whether the specific molecules themselves would have been
obvious, in the absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs."'os
Eisenberg correctly notes that with knowledge of a partial amino acid
sequence and standard cloning techniques "a geneticist would have constructed
nucleotide probes to find a corresponding cDNA molecule in a cDNA library,
with a great expectation of success."' 0 6 However, Eisenberg also notes that
Deuel foreclosed the possibility that later developed, more complex, DNA
sequencing technology could help render DNA sequence patents obvious.' 0 I
also note that Deuel was a case decided in 1995 before KSR. In contrast, Kubin, a
case decided post-KSR, effectively limited Deuel to those specific facts, while
not expressly overruling Deuel.0 8
However, I argue that the Federal Circuit's analysis in Deuel is not
completely without merit. Similar to variants of drug type chemical compounds,
if one specific degenerate primer had unexpected beneficial properties, this
should help render that specific primer nonobvious over the art. Additionally, I
note that these DNA patents may have easy "design arounds" due to the
degenerate nature of the code. That is, the longer the DNA sequence, the more
options companies have to make similar DNA sequences that code for the same
amino acid sequence without literally infringing the claims.
Other scholars suggest that the utility requirement could also serve to
limit gene patents. For example, Michael Risch explores the use of the utility
requirement to limit patents to natural substances.'0 9 This would work in concert
with prior case law such as In re Fisher, which dealt with incomplete DNA
fragments or expressed sequence tags ("EST"s)."o Risch suggests that the utility
requirement could also be used without running into the written description
issues of 35 U.S.C. § 112.111 For example, in the case of ESTs, the written
description/enablement requirements would be met because one of skill in the art
could easily describe the EST (by giving the full sequence of the EST) and also
enable those skilled in the art on how to use the claimed gene fragments.
However, if the underlying function of the gene was unknown, then the EST
would not meet the utility bar under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, only gene patents
with known utility could obtain patent protection.

'"4Id.at 1559.
105Id.
106 Eisenberg, supra note
07

61, at 404.
Id.
'os1n re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
109 Michael Risch, A SurprisinglyUseful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 57 (2011).
110 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that the utility bar was not met when
it came to expressed sequence tags (ESTs), which were used for identifying nucleic acid in maize
plants).
"' Risch, supra note 109.
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The utility requirement provides one avenue for rejection of gene patents
that would be narrower than banning gene patents under the subject matter
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the utility requirement may not
provide the flexibility or breadth found in the obviousness standard. For
example, both the BRCAl and BRCA2 gene patents would be held valid under
the utility standard, if these genes could be linked to a specific function (such as
diagnosis of breast cancer). This would be true even if the BRCA2 gene (which
shares large structural similarity with the BRCAl gene) were discovered much
later in time. However, under the obviousness standard, the BRCAl gene patents
may be held valid, while the BRCA2 gene patents may not be held valid if
determined to be an obvious variant of the BRCAl gene. That is, in light of the
BRCAl genes, if one of skill in the art would have been motivated to search for
structurally similar genes (such as BRCA2) with a reasonable expectation of
success, then the later found gene would not be patentable due to a failure to
overcome the obviousness bar.
Perhaps if a bright line rule is absolutely necessary regarding gene
patents, which I do not advocate, a better test would look at the protein in
question (and not the gene sequence). Specifically, an alternative test could first
determine if the protein is patentable or unpatentable, then, based on that opinion,
whether the DNA sequence should be patentable or not would correlate to the
patentability of the protein. When applied to gene patents, if the protein is found
in nature, then the corresponding DNA sequences (including degenerate
sequences) should not be patentable.
D. 35 U.S.C. § 101 Should Not be Used to Invalidate Gene Patents
Commentators have suggested that the rationale behind § 101 is to act as
a gatekeeper to exclude "bad patents."ll 2 Joshua Sarnoff argues that 101 "largely
duplicates patentability criteria [such as novelty, non-obviousness and adequate
disclosure]."'" 3 Accordingly, the ACLU in the Myriad case argues that gene
patents should be non-patentable subject matter.'14
In contrast, I argue that § 101 does not serve a redundant function, and is
not a substitution for concepts of novelty, non-obviousness and/or adequate
disclosure. As an initial matter, § 101 is written in the positive, thus defining that
which is included as patent eligible. Specifically, § 101 defines subject matter
that is patent eligible.' In contrast, § 102 and § 103 only define subject matter

112Joshua D. Samoff, Patent Eligible Medical and Biotechnology Inventions after Bilski,
Prometheus, and Myriad, 19 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 393 (2011).
113id.
114See id at 408-10.

"1s 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.") (emphasis added).
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that is not patent eligible.' 16 Thus, 102 and 103 describe that which is excluded
from patent eligibility. Accordingly, § 101 narrows patentable subject matter
much more than § 102 and § 103, because even though § 101 is very broad, the
negative limitations set forth in 102 and 103 are limitless.
Defining the universe of patentable subject matter also serves an
important economic function. Section 101 is drafted in recognition of the fact
that some subject matter (even though non-obvious, novel and enabled) is so
fundamental that it should remain public domain for all to use. Issuing patents to
fundamental ideas or laws of nature would have a host of practical problems. For
example, it would be difficult to determine the cohort of accused infringers who
infringed a method patent that required only mental steps. Litigation of these
types of patents would be difficult if only for the discovery issues. Similarly, if a
law of nature, such as gravity, were patented the potential infringers would be
boundless.
However, I believe § 101 is too blunt an instrument to invalidate all gene
patents. Many commentators have noted the importance of patents to the
biotechnology industry.' 17 In fact, some empirical studies have argued that many
products in the pharmaceutical industry would not have been developed or
introduced without the incentive of patent protection." 8
Although the Federal Circuit specifically stated that § 101 may be
appropriate for certain technologies, such as isolated DNA, they seem to be
moving away from use of § 101 to invalidate patents."' 9 Specifically, in a recent
decision by Judge Plager, the Federal Circuit invalided a set of patents as
anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 instead of
walking into "murky morass that is 101 jurisprudence." 1 20 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit avoided the patentable subject matter eligibility question, and
instead focused on the question of anticipation and obviousness, which "on
review would have some semblance of a chance at arriving at a predictable and
understandable result."l 2 1 Furthermore, the court stated that avoiding § 101 and
focusing on § 102, 103 and 112 would "make patent litigation more efficient,
conserve judicial resources, and bring a degree of certainty to the interests of
both patentees and their competitors in the marketplace." 22

Id. § 102 ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless. . .") (emphasis added); id § 103 ("A
patent may not be obtained. . .") (emphasis added).
117 RICHARD E. CAVES, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & MARK A. HURWITZ, PATENT EXPIRATION, ENTRY,
116

AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (1991); see also Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access
to New Pharmaceuticals,5 J.OF INT'L ECON L. 849 (2002).
118 Edwin Mansfield, Patentsand Innovation, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986).
" Myspace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., No. 2011-1149, 2012 WL 716435, at *20 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2,
2012) (stating that it "would be a rather unusual and infrequent circumstance" that abstract ideas
under § 101 should be used to invalidate a patent).
20

Id. at *17.

121 Id.
122

at *20.

Id. at *17. In dissent, Judge Mayer argued that the subject matter eligibility standard under 35
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Use of a flexible obviousness standard allows for a case-by-case analysis
to determine if the specific gene patent application in question reaches the
threshold of patentability. This type of analysis is exactly what patent examiners
do on a day to day basis. Additionally, patent examiners are much more suited to
engage in this type of analysis when compared to most litigators, judges, or
legislators because patent examiners have the specialized technical background
necessary to determine obviousness. Finally, when applied to gene patents, use
of an obviousness standard will dampen the disruption to the current
technological field, simply because the industry has relied upon validity of gene
patents for decades. That is, wholesale abolition of gene patents through the
rubric of non-patentable subject matter, would create a huge disruption to the
business models of the biotechnology industry.
In contrast, use of an
obviousness standard, similar to the analysis done in Funk Brothers, would help
limit "bad gene patents" while allowing patents to truly innovative research.

U.S.C. § 101 should be an "antecedent question" that needed to be addressed before the court could
consider whether claims were anticipated or obvious.

